During the first half of the nineteenth century the United States emerged as a major producer of cotton textiles. This paper argues that the expansion of domestic textile production is best understood as a path-dependent process that was initiated by the protection provided by the Embargo Act of 1807 and the War of 1812. This initial period of protection ended abruptly in 1815 with the conclusion of the war and the resumption of British imports, but the political climate had been irreversibly changed by the temporary expansion of the industry. After 1815 nascent manufacturers sought to protect the investments they had made by lobbying Congress. Their efforts had an important impact on the provisions concerning cotton textiles in the tariff bill of 1816, and during the 1820s manufacturers won increasingly strong protection, culminating in the passage of the "Tariff of Abominations" in 1828.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States was a minor contributor to world production of cotton textiles. Yet by mid-century the United States was the world's second largest producer of textiles. 1 The rapid take-off in American textile production is summarized in Table 1 , which shows numbers of spindles in the United States and Britain in the century after 1790. With the growth of textile production, the United States also developed an active community of textile machinery producers who became a source of important innovations in both factory spinning and weaving technologies. In particular, Americans were the leading innovators in the development of ring spinning techniques, while British machinery producers concentrated on advancing mule spinning. During the second half of the nineteenth century American advances in ring spinning made their way back across the Atlantic, as
British machinery producers began to borrow from Americans. 2 The rapid growth of the American textile industry during the nineteenth century was an important component of the broader process of American industrialization. Cotton textile factories were the single largest employer of manufacturing labor and textile machinery producers made important contributions to the production of steam engines, locomotives, and other industrial machinery. The concentration of textile producers in the New England region for most of the nineteenth century magnified their impact on the regional economy. Because of the geographic concentration of textile production, New
England industrialized much more rapidly than did the rest of the country. By 1880, close to 40 percent of New England workers were employed in manufacturing, and of these 37 percent were employed in the production of textiles. In other words, approximately one of every six workers in New England was engaged in textile production.
Viewed from the perspective of the early nineteenth century it was not at all obvious that the United States would emerge as an important producer of cotton textiles.
Population and markets were small and widely scattered, capital was expensive, and skilled textile workers were in scarce supply. 3 That the industry would become localized in New England would also have been difficult to predict at this time. Although some accounts have emphasized water power as a potential source of locational advantage, this explanation does not stand up to careful examination. There were in fact many comparable water power sites in the Mid Atlantic region, and in the Piedmont areas further South. 4 Moreover, according to Albert Bolles, writing toward the end of the nineteenth century, the region's natural endowment was if anything unconducive to textile manufacturing.
The climate was dry and cold, entailing a large expense in warming and steaming the air of the mills…The factories were situated many hundreds of miles away from the cotton growing regions, entailing another large expense…[And] the waterpower of the South was as abundant and cheap too, as that of the North. 5 While purely locational factors do not help to explain New England's leadership in textile production, a more persuasive case can be made for the role of labor supply conditions. 6 Nonetheless, labor supply appears to have been more important in allowing the industry to expand after its initial establishment than in influencing entrepreneurial decisions about where to locate factories. 7 In light of the importance of cotton textiles in both national and regional economic development it is important to understand how and why the U.S. industry developed when and where it did. As befits a topic of this importance the history of New
England textile production has been documented in considerable detail. 8 My purpose
here is to offer a new interpretation of these facts. In this chapter I argue that the development of the American cotton textile industry, and its localization in New England can best be understood as a path-dependent process in which transitory historical "accidents" altered the course of development producing effects long after the conditions to which they gave rise had disappeared. 9 Specifically, I argue that the protection provided by the Embargo Act of 1807 and the War of 1812 led to the initial expansion of textile manufacturing in the United States.
This transitory period of protection ended abruptly in 1815 with the conclusion of the war and the resumption of British imports. But the political climate had been irreversibly changed by the temporary expansion of textile manufacturing. Nascent manufacturers for the first time sought to influence tariff policy. Their lobbying had an important impact on the provisions concerning cotton textiles in the tariff bill of 1816, and during the 1820s manufacturers won increasingly strong protection, culminating in the passage of the "Tariff of Abominations" in 1828. In particular, the 1816 bill incorporated a provision specifying a minimum valuation for textiles that created substantially greater protection for the less expensive and coarser fabric produced by the newly established Boston
Manufacturing Company. This protection was important in providing the company the time it needed to perfect the novel system of production-relying on the power loom and vertically integrated production-that it had introduced, and initiating the process of technological innovation that led to rapidly falling costs. Although the focus of my account is on the relationship between the temporary episode of protection after 1807 and the development of the power loom, this was not the only channel through which path dependence operated. The impact of the early industry's development on the formation of an industrial labor force, and the creation of a community of engineers and mechanics familiar with the construction and maintenance of textile machinery provided additional sources of irreversibility that helped to promote the growth of the industry once it had been established.
There is, of course, a large literature devoted to the question of whether protective tariffs were important in the development of the American textile industry. 10 But most of this literature has focused its attention on the question of whether the higher rates enacted in the 1820s were essential. Given the limitations of the data, this question is unlikely ever to be resolved to the full satisfaction of all participants, but it is my contention that it was the earlier period of protection that preceded the tariff that was crucial in setting the stage for subsequent growth, and indeed in influencing legislative actions that resulted in protection, whether necessary or not. In the absence of these events, the course of American economic development could well have been substantially different.
The Early Development of the American Textile Industry
Before 1807 the scarcity of skilled labor and capital in conjunction with small and diffuse markets for yarn and cloth discouraged the growth of textile production in America. Americans were well informed about British innovations in textile technology
and there had been a number of successful efforts to recruit British artisans with the knowledge to build and operate machinery based on these innovations. Yet, the American industry remained small in size and limited in scope. In 1807, there were still just 8,000 spindles in operation in America, a miniscule figure when set against the millions of spindles in Britain at this time.
The small size of the American industry reflects its competitive disadvantages in this era, not a lack of information about British technology. Knowledge of British innovations in spinning crossed the Atlantic quite rapidly. Within 5 years of Hargreave's 1770 patent on the spinning jenny, for example, two 24-spindle jennies were in operation in Philadelphia, one having been built for a immigrant weaver, and the other constructed by a local craftsman. 11 Although the jenny multiplied yarn output, it still relied on skilled labor for its operation, and the shortage of such skilled labor was apparently a significant obstacle to its widespread adoption in the United States. Despite the efforts of various groups throughout the Northeast to promote domestic textile manufacturing, capacity expanded only slowly. By 1790 there were still fewer than 10 textile manufactories in the United States operating less than 2,000 jenny spindles.
Typical of these efforts was the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, which was formed by a group of Massachusetts merchants in 1787. The founders hired an English emigrant weaver, Thomas Somers, to supervise operations, and equipped the company with an Arkwright roller card, four jennies, a twisting mill, a warping mill, and fly shuttle looms.
Despite attracting the attention of many visitors, the company was unable to turn a profit even though it was exempted from taxation, and subsidized by the state legislature.
Confronted with continuing losses it shut its doors within a few years. The modest growth of American factory production of textiles relied largely on the waterframe. 18 In contrast, mule spinning, which was much more prominent in Britain, made limited progress in the United States. Like the spinning wheel and jenny (and unlike the waterframe) the mule relied on intermittent spinning in which yarn was first drawn out and twisted, and was then spun onto the spindle. Unlike the waterframe, the mule required adult operatives with considerable skill and hand-eye coordination, but it allowed for the production of finer yarns, and made it possible to utilize shorter-staple cottons than were possible with the waterframe. 19 By 1790, British factories had nearly 700,000 mule spindles in operation compared to just 310,000 waterframe spindles.
While both numbers continued to grow, the number of mule spindles grew more quickly, reflecting the advantages in the British context of the mule's greater versatility in producing a range of different yarns along with the more abundant supply of skilled mule spinners. 20 The passage of the Embargo Act, which took effect in December 1807, effectively blocking trade with Europe caused a dramatic shift in the fortunes of domestic manufacturing in the United States. The Embargo created in effect nearly complete protection for domestic producers while substantially contracting export markets for raw cotton and thus lowering the price of this crucial input. Although the longer-run effect of the embargo was to stimulate production, the immediate effect was a sharp reduction in demand for American yarn. Almy and Brown's chief markets were in New England, and the merchants upon whom they relied to distribute yarn were hit hard by the collapse of trade caused by the embargo. Nonetheless, the embargo created new opportunities that soon buoyed production. 21 The growing population in the trans-Allegheny west had until now been supplied largely with fabrics imported by Philadelphia and Baltimore merchants. Faced with the cessation of these imports, merchants in these Mid-Atlantic cities turned to the New England mills. Prior to the embargo, more than half of Almy and Brown's sales had been to merchants in Boston and other northern New England cities. In 1808, however, this share fell to just 17 percent, while Philadelphia and Baltimore together accounted for 44 percent of their sales, up from 24 percent in 1806. 22 The cessation of trade caused by the Embargo Act, and the subsequent disruptions due to the Non-intercourse Act and the open hostilities with Britain that began in 1812 made domestic production much more profitable than it had previously been. As Figure   1 illustrates, while the prices of cloth rose, the cost of raw cotton was falling after 1808. production had doubled consumption of cotton from 500 to 1,000 bales. In the next five years cotton consumption increased ten-fold, and by 1815 it had grown to 90,000 bales. 23 Peace and the resumption of British imports brought this period of expansion to an abrupt end, a fact clearly reflected in the sharp drop in factory incorporations after 1814.
The Origins of the Massachusetts System
The growth of domestic textile production in the United States after 1807 was based almost entirely on supplying the growing demand for cloth, not yarn. To meet this demand the Slater-style mills of southern New England were obliged to find weavers to convert their factory spun yarn into fabric. They did this through a proliferation of arrangements with individual weavers. But this situation proved highly unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The supply of weavers in proximity to the spinning mills was quickly exhausted, making it necessary to contract over increasingly long distances.
Many of the weavers Slater dealt with, for example, were more than 20 miles away.
Moreover, individual weavers proved unreliable, and the quality of their work varied substantially. Almy and Brown expressed their frustration in securing regular deliveries from outworkers in an 1809 letter, observing that "we have several hundred pieces now out weaving…but a hundred looms in families will not weave as much cloth as ten at least constant workmen." The next year they abandoned outwork entirely, setting up a group of hand weavers in their workshop and instructing their superintendent to spin only as much yarn as these weavers could convert into cloth. 24 The scarcity of hand weavers was thus a significant bottleneck to the growth of the American textile industry. Seeking to overcome this obstacle a number of manufacturers and mechanics sought to develop a power loom. British innovators had been working on developing power looms as well, but the much more abundant supply of skilled hand weavers must have made the need for such an innovation far less pressing. 25 Among the Americans interested in power weaving was Francis Lowell, a Boston merchant. Lowell had spent several years in Scotland, and had made careful observations of British textile technologies during his time abroad. Now he drew on this knowledge to develop plans for a power loom. In 1813, during the wartime boom in domestic textile production, Lowell in combination with a small group of Boston businessmen established the Boston Manufacturing Company, with the goal of spinning and weaving cotton cloth in a single integrated factory. 26 Working with a skilled mechanic, Paul Moody, he was able to construct a satisfactory loom, and the Boston Manufacturing Company produced its first cloth in 1815.
In contrast to American borrowing of spinning technology, the development of power weaving proceeded more or less in parallel in the United States and Britain, and
Lowell's solution to the problem of power weaving was rather different from British efforts. From the outset, Lowell's goal was to weave a single, uniform product. As Nathan Appleton, one of Lowell's associates in the formation of the Boston Manufacturing Company recalled: "The article first made at Waltham, was precisely the article of which a large portion of the manufacture of this country has continued to consist; a heavy sheeting of No. 14 yarn, 37 inches wide, 44 picks to the inch, and weighing something less than three yards to the pound." This was a plain, coarsely woven, but durable fabric that Lowell intended to compete primarily with the "yard wide goods of India" that had heretofore supplied the country. 27 By dispensing with the need for flexibility, and concentrating on weaving coarse yarn, Lowell was able to substantially simplify the mechanical problem of building his loom. In particular, because the coarser yarn that Lowell planned to use would be able to withstand relatively greater stresses than finer yarns, he was able to dispense with the need for a variable speed batten and the complex gearing that that implied. There is little evidence to document the evolution of Lowell's thinking at this time, so it is difficult to say if he was remarkably prescient in adapting the Boston Manufacturing Company's production process to America conditions, or if he was simply lucky. But in either event the system that emerged was remarkably well suited to the factor proportions and product markets that confronted American producers at this time. Using coarse yarn spun on waterframes to weave a coarse but durable fabric, Lowell was able to substitute higher quality raw materials and special purpose machinery for relatively scarce skilled labor, while meeting a growing domestic market. 28 Developing a power loom was essential to overcoming the shortage of hand weavers in the United States, but the decision of Lowell and his associates to embed the use of the loom in an integrated textile factory was arguably as important in terms of its influence on the industry's subsequent development. From the outset, Lowell envisioned the Boston Manufacturing Company as encompassing the entire range of production activities involved in converting raw cotton into cloth. In particular this meant that spinning and weaving operations could be closely matched to each other, ensuring that yarn suitable for the power looms was produced in the appropriate quantity, and that there would be a use for all of the yarn that was spun by the factory. This close integration, in conjunction with the decision to produce a single uniform type of fabric also reduced the need for flexibility in production.
Although the technologies adopted by the Boston Manufacturing Company did not require craft skills, they nonetheless placed substantial demands on existing sources of labor supply. The scale of the company's operations required a much larger labor force than existing spinning mills had needed, and the physical demands of operating the equipment meant that the bulk of this labor had to be performed by adults. An adequate supply of labor was not to be found at the factory site. To meet its labor needs the company was obliged to innovate by recruiting young women from rural areas of New
England and providing suitable housing for them near the factory. 29 That there was a large pool of potential labor in the countryside to be recruited facilitated the industry's subsequent expansion, but there is little indication that this realization had much impact on the company's initial choice of location.
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While Lowell and his associates focused on mechanizing and speeding up the production of a small range of fabrics by substituting special purpose machinery for skilled labor, British inventors devoted considerable attention to the development of machinery that could be adapted to produce a broad range of different yarns and fabrics.
In doing so, the machinery they devised continued to rely much more heavily on the more abundant supplies of skilled mule spinners available in Britain. Such a strategy was essential in the vertically disintegrated British industry, where spinning mills had to be able to adapt to the shifting demands of weavers. It also reflected the larger market for high quality products that British manufacturers supplied. 31 Britain's continued reliance on mule spinning reinforced the divergence of the two national systems because the primary route into the ranks of skilled mule spinners was through informal apprenticeship as a piecer. 32 Thus an important by-product of reliance on mules was the production of the next generation of mule spinners.
Beyond reducing demand for skilled mule spinners and hand weavers, the Boston Manufacturing Company's decision to integrate production served to focus innovation on bottlenecks in the production process. Realizing the benefits of the new power looms, for example, required improvements in the process of warping and dressing. After the introduction of the power loom, Moody turned his attention to improving existing techniques for winding and dressing the warp yarns for power looms. By altering the position of the warping beams and adding drying fans he was able to speed the process of dressing the yarn, while the introduction of stop action devices that would detect breaks in the yarn allowed warping to be carried out more rapidly. Because of the stresses it placed on the yarn the Waltham loom also required yarns with a relatively high twist.
Imparting this twist meant that spindles had to turn more slowly, and increased the number of spindles necessary to supply each loom. This trade-off encouraged American innovators to search for ways to increase the speed at which yarn could be spun. At the same time that integration focused attention on bottlenecks slowing production, it also created opportunities for cost savings. A good example of this is provided by Moody's development of a filling frame that used bobbins that could be used in powered looms, thus avoiding a separate step to wind the yarn onto the bobbins. 33 The Boston Manufacturing Company commenced production in January 1815, and by 1816 the initial plant, equipped with 2,000 spindles, was in full operation. By early 1818 a second mill was under construction. During these early years Moody continued to refine existing machinery, and develop new equipment. By about 1820
Moody had completed the basic set of machinery on which the Waltham system rested, but the rapid pace of advance in total factor productivity throughout the 1820s and 1830s
suggests that learning-by-doing continued to create substantial opportunities for incremental improvement in the production process. 34 By 1820 the company had of development. For a number of years, these firms continued to rely on hand weaving to produce finer and more complex fabrics, such as checks and plaids, which could not be produced on power looms. But competition from imported cloth imposed significant pressures on these companies, and most went out of business. The resulting decline in demand for hand weavers helped to reduce hand weaving rates, however, making it possible for the survivors to hold out for quite a while. Slater, for example, did not abandon hand weaving until 1827. Thus, there was a gradual convergence toward integrated production and power looms throughout New England, but the route followed by the Rhode Island producers was rather different from their neighbors to the North. 36 In contrast to the technological convergence of the industry in New England, producers in Philadelphia continued to rely more on hand weaving, producing finer and more varied goods, and seeking to adjust production to changes in market demand. 37 The
Philadelphia producers struggled, however, in the face of import competition, and they remained a relatively small part of the American industry. In 1831, Pennsylvania produced just 10 percent of the nation's cloth, while New England accounted for 71 percent.
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Tariff Protection and Path Dependence
The protection from foreign competition afforded the American textile industry after 1807 was instrumental in the rapid expansion of capacity, and encouraged the The effect of renewed competition was devastating for American textile producers. In June 1816, Nathan Appleton accompanied Lowell on a tour of a number of Rhode Island mills, finding production at a standstill:
We proceeded to Pawtucket. We called on Mr. Wilkinson, the maker of machinery. He took us into his establishment-a large one; all was silent, not a wheel in motion, not a man to be seen. He informed us that there was not a spindle running in Pawtucket, except a few in Slater's old mill, making yarns. All was dead and still…We saw several manufacturers; they were all sad and despairing. 41 Without additional protection it appears that conditions would have returned to something like the situation that prevailed before 1807. Recognizing this, many of the new manufacturers turned to Congress in hopes of rescuing their investments.
The temporary increase in duties passed at the outset of the War of 1812 was slated to end one year after conclusion of the peace treaty. Consequently early in 1816
Congress took up the question of establishing new duties. Reporting on the subject, the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures explicitly noted the difficulties of cotton manufacturers, and the numerous petitions that had been received from them advocating greater tariff protection. Citing the perilous condition of these manufacturers, the committee went on to note that passage of a protective tariff would put the manufacturers "…again into operation with increased powers; but should it be withheld they will be prostrated….A capital of near sixty millions of dollars will become inactive, the greater part of which will be a dead loss to the manufacturers." Calhoun [both of South Carolina], to support the minimum…" 45 By focusing on the minimum clause rather than a high overall rate, Lowell had found a way to circumvent important sectional conflicts on trade, and win the backing necessary to gain protection that he believed his company needed. Because Indian textiles did not use American cotton, it was possible for at least some influential southern Congressmen to support the minimum clause, which effectively excluded Asian cloth, while continuing their opposition to high overall tariff rates, which would threaten the British manufacturers who were the main consumers of America cotton. 46 The importance of Lowell's strategy, and the effect of his effort to win southern support for the minimum is apparent in the two key votes on the tariff bill, which are compared in Table 2 . In the first vote, the House by a large majority voted to reduce the proposed tariff on textiles from 30 percent in the first 2 years to 25 percent for two years, followed by a 20 percent rate in subsequent years. As Table 2 Island and around Philadelphia, whose products competed more directly with those of British manufacturers. Many went out of business, and others substantially scaled back production. One of the clearest signs of contraction is the declining demand for hand weavers, who saw piece rates fall from a third to a half between 1816 and 1820 as they were squeezed between the lower cost of machine woven plain cloth and the low prices of imported fancy goods from Britain.
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The continued depression of traditional textile manufacturers in Philadelphia was clearly captured in data collected for the census of 1820. At the firm of Craige, Holmes & Co., which had begun production in 1809, the number of outwork weavers fell from a peak of 300 during the war to only 150 by 1820. Other manufacturers had also contracted production substantially. Table 3 based on econometric analysis of the relationship between the relative price of imported cloth and domestic cloth production. 56 Irwin and Temin found that domestic production was insensitive to variation in the price of imported British cloth (incorporating the effects of the tariff), which they interpreted as evidence that the two products were sufficiently differentiated that they did not compete directly. The difficulty with this interpretation is that given the apparent redundancy of the rates that prevailed from the early 1830s through 1846 there is no reason to expect that marginal variations in tariff rates would have any impact on the volume of domestic production. Although this objection does not apply to the post-1846 period, there was no variation in tariff rates after this date, and British export prices changed little in this period, so it is hardly surprising and not terribly informative that their regression fails to find a relationship between import price movements and domestic cloth production. That American production did not fall after 1846, does suggests that American producers could by this date hold their own against international competition with a minimum of protection. But dating the transition more precisely is nearly impossible given the types of evidence Associated with these different products were very different technological paradigms. British technological innovation focused on increasing the versatility of machinery to allow shifts in count and fineness in response to shifting market opportunities. Thus considerable effort was devoted to developing a fully automated mule, perfecting looms that could be adapted to producing different weaves of cloth, and roving machines that could produce a wide range of rovings. In contrast, American innovations focused primarily on reducing capital and labor costs by increasing the speed with which standard counts of yarn and standardized fabrics could be produced. By midcentury American advances in continuous spinning had proceeded far enough that they began to be re-imported by British textile machine makers.
Conclusion
By the mid-nineteenth century, America had emerged as the second largest producer of textiles in the world, and while American manufacturers were not competitive in export markets with British manufacturers, they dominated their own large domestic market and had developed a distinctive and eventually highly influential mass production technology that was substantially different from the more vertically disintegrated and craft-based production system in Britain. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, this situation would have been viewed as highly improbable.
Explaining how the American textile industry overcame its initial disadvantages is central 
